As I have posted before, Pres. Trump's executive order on anti-Semitism, issued last December, has been broadly misinterpreted as threatening to squelch criticism of Israel on college campuses. Recently, for example, in an otherwise thoughtful post on the right-wing "weaponization of free speech," Prof. Joan Wallach Scott seriously mischaracterized it. Writing on the AAUP’s Academe Blog, she asserts that the EO "rules that any criticism of Israel be considered anti-Semitic,” adding “In this order, free speech is explicitly denied to critics of Israel, it is deemed hate speech and therefore intolerable in our country.” It is always wise to be wary of the Trump administration’s intentions, especially when it comes to the Middle East, and I was equally suspicious when I saw the initial press reports about the anti-Semitism executive order. But that was before I read the document itself.
It turns out that Scott's claim is wrong in every particular. Nowhere does the EO provide "that any criticism of Israel be considered anti-Semitic." It does not "explicitly" deny free speech to "critics of Israel," nor does it deem criticism of Israel "hate speech and therefore intolerable." It would be a fair criticism to say that the executive order goes too far – or that it is an unnecessary overreaction – but it is counterproductive and tendentious for Prof. Scott to exaggerate its sweep. It can be viewed here.
As can be immediately seen, the order says only that federal agencies investigating “evidence of discrimination" should consider
. . . the non-legally binding working definition of anti- Semitism adopted on May 26, 2016, by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), which states, “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”
There is no provision in the EO identifying criticism of Israel as hate speech, nor does it otherwise call for punishing or restricting Israel’s many critics. The EO does provide that the “‘Contemporary Examples of Anti-Semitism’ identified by the IHRA . . . might be useful as evidence of discriminatory intent (emphasis added).” In turn, the IHRA working definition — unmentioned by Prof. Scott — sets out a number of examples that, “taking into account the overall context," could be evidence of “anti-Semitism in public life.” The examples suggested by the IHRA include Holocaust denial, spreading myths about Jewish conspiracies, claiming that Jews control banking and the media, and accusations of dual loyalty, which presumably do not raise free speech concerns for Prof. Scott.
Several of the examples touch on Israel, including “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor” and “Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.” These are quite similar to statements made by Bernie Sanders in his own essay on "How to Fight Anti-Semitism." Importantly, and contrary to Prof. Scott's assertion, the IHRA working definition does not state that all such expressions are inherently anti-Semitic, but only that they could be indicative “in the overall context” of anti-Jewish sentiments. The EO makes the connection even more contingent, saying only that the examples “might be useful” in determining intent with regard to actual discriminatory treatment of Jews.
The IHRA working definition was adopted by the U.S. Department of State under the Obama administration, and by 30 other countries. It was later adopted by other governments and organizations, including (following some controversy) the British Labour Party.
Most significantly, the working definition carries no force of its own, either in the IHRA document or by reference in the Trump EO. Rather, it provides examples, most of which have nothing to do with Israel, that may be relevant when investigating cases of discriminatory conduct. It takes a profound argumentative stretch to reinterpret this to mean “that any criticism of Israel [will] be considered anti-Semitic.” Indeed, the alternative would be to insist that accusations about Israel – even when made by the likes of David Duke or Louis Farrakhan – could never be considered when investigating acts of anti-Jewish discrimination under Title VI. I trust Prof. Scott realizes that anti-Israel rhetoric can be, and often is, a cover for traditional anti-Semitism.
I agree with Prof. Scott’s condemnation of state anti-BDS statutes and related lawsuits, which have no place in a democracy (as I have written many times). Likewise, I agree that it was wrong for the Department of Education to intervene in the Duke-UNC Middle East Studies Program on the ground that it did not present enough “positive” imagery of Judaism and Christianity. On the other hand, it is regrettable that she makes no mention at all of the recent wave of anti-Semitism, including increasingly violent attacks, some of which appear to have been motivated or accompanied by anti-Israel rhetoric.
Realistically, the EO should be recognized as a symbolic gesture to right-wing supporters of the Netanyahu government (which is not the same thing as supporting Israel's existence). That is nothing to admire, but it is not cause for alarm. There are plenty of threats to free speech under the Trump administration; there is no need to invent them where they do not exist.
NOTE: Prof. Scott's remarks were originally delivered at a panel on “Academic Freedom and the Historical Profession” at the annual conference of the American Historical Association in New York on January 6.
UPDATE: This post has been slightly edited